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This paper examines the factors that influence banks’ type of organizational form when 
operating in foreign markets, using an original database on the branches and subsidiaries in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe of the top 100 international banks. We find that regulation, 
taxation, the degree of desired penetration in the local market, and host-country economic and 
political risks matter. Banks are more likely to operate as branches in countries that have higher 
corporate taxes and when they face lower regulatory restrictions on bank entry, in general, and 
on foreign branches, in particular. Subsidiaries are the preferred organizational form by banks 
that seek to penetrate the local market establishing large and mostly retail operations. Finally, 
there is evidence that economic and political risks have opposite effects on the type of 
organizational form, suggesting that legal differences in the degree of parent bank responsibility 
vis-à-vis branches and subsidiaries under different risk scenarios play an important role in the 
kind of operations international banks maintain overseas.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
Over the last two decades, many countries liberalized bank activities that traditionally 
had been heavily regulated and protected from competition. As part of this process, foreign 
banks, which had previously played only a marginal role, have established a substantial presence 
in the banking systems of several middle-income and developing countries. That presence has 
taken a variety of forms, ranging from the acquisition of domestic institutions with extensive 
branch networks to the establishment of isolated representative offices aimed at serving niche 
market segments. However, in contrast to the growing debate on the merits and pitfalls 
associated with an extensive foreign bank presence in emerging markets, little attention has been 
paid to how that presence is established. In particular, the literature has largely ignored what 
determines whether banks operate as locally incorporated and independently capitalized 
subsidiaries or as branches when going overseas.  
In this paper, using a newly put together database on the activities of the top 100 
international banks worldwide, we try to fill this gap by examining what factors affect the type of 
organizational form under which banks operate in foreign markets. We focus on foreign bank 
operations in Latin America and Eastern Europe, the two regions that have witnessed the largest 
increase in foreign bank participation over the last decade. In both regions, current levels of 
foreign bank participation exceed 50 % of banking system assets in many countries. 
There are at least two sets of reasons for which policy makers, bank users, and bankers 
should care about how foreign banks operate in host markets. First, the organizational form of 
foreign bank operations may affect the competitive structure of the local banking systems, 
threatening the profits and market share of domestic banks and affecting the price and quality of 
banking services in the host country. For example, foreign subsidiaries with extensive networks 
are in direct competition with local commercial banks for retail clients, while single-branch  
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foreign banks or representative offices concentrate, instead, on segments such as wholesale and 
investment banking, which are typically undeveloped in the host countries. Second, branches and 
subsidiaries typically involve different levels of parent bank responsibility and financial support. 
While subsidiaries are separate entities from their parent banks, under most circumstances, 
parent banks are responsible for the liabilities of their branches.
1 This can have implications not 
only for the parent bank but also for local regulators, who care about the stability of the host-
country, and for local depositors, who care about the safety of their savings. 
We build an empirical reduced form model that allows banks’ organizational form to 
depend on parent bank characteristics, home-country regulations, the desired level of penetration 
in the host market (as proxied by affiliate bank characteristics) and host-country factors. Among 
the parent bank characteristics, we allow parent banks’ size, business orientation (wholesale 
versus retail), degree of international presence, and past expansion strategies to affect foreign 
banks’ organizational form in a given host-country. We measure the desired level of penetration 
in the host market by controlling for the affiliate size and business orientation.  
Among the host-country factors, we consider the impact of legal restrictions on foreign 
bank operations, entry requirements, and corporate taxes. In addition, we examine whether 
differences in the degree of legal responsibility by parent banks vis-à-vis the liabilities of their 
overseas branches and subsidiaries play a role in foreign banks’ organizational form. If these 
differences indeed affect banks’ organizational form, branches would tend to be the preferred 
                                                 
1 The recent crisis in Argentina provides us with examples of the different type of behavior of branches and 
subsidiaries in line with their legal responsibilities regarding their local liabilities. While Citibank announced an 
increase in the capital of its branch operations in Argentina, it opted for selling its subsidiary (Bansud). Also, in 
Argentina Credit Agricole decided to cut its losses by letting the government take over its subsidiaries Bersa, Bisel 
and Suquia. In Eastern Europe, the Bayerische Landesbank gave up its subsidiary, Croatian Rijecka bank, after a 
trader at the subsidiary incurred huge foreign exchange losses.  
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organizational form in host countries characterized by relatively higher economic and political 
risks.  
This question is empirically relevant, especially considering that in practice the 
distinction between branches and subsidiaries in times of crisis may be much more blurred due to 
special contractual arrangements (such as ring-fencing provisions) and reputational 
considerations. On the one hand, ring-fencing provisions may limit the losses faced by parent 
banks when their branches are in trouble. Such provisions generally establish that parent banks 
are not required to repay the obligations of a foreign branch if the branch faces repayment 
problems due to extreme circumstances (such as war or civil conflict) or due to certain actions by 
the host government (e.g., exchange controls, expropriations, etc.). In recent years, a number of 
banking groups have adopted ring fencing provisions.
2 On the other hand, concerns about loss of 
reputation have in certain instances led parent banks to rescue and recapitalize subsidiaries, even 
if they were not legally forced to do so.
3  
Our findings confirm some of our expectations, but also pose new questions, and 
challenge some established views. First, regulations and institutional factors appear to have a 
paramount effect. Foreign banks are less likely to operate as branches in countries that limit their 
                                                 
2 In the case of U.S. bank branches section 25C of the Federal Reserve Act establishes that “a member bank shall not 
be required to repay any deposit made at a foreign branch of the bank if the branch cannot repay the deposit due to 
an act of war, insurrection, or civil strife or (2) an action by a foreign government or instrumentality (whether de 
jure or de facto) in the country in which the branch is located, unless the member bank has expressly agreed in 
writing to repay the deposit under those circumstances”. Another example of ring fencing provisions are the clauses 
included in the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreement. These Ring-Fencing 
Provisions stipulate that the headquarters will bear no responsibility for transactions made at overseas branches in 
the case of exchange controls or expropriation (see ISDA (2003), Section 10 (a) Ring-Fencing Agreements). 
3 For example, HSCB injected more than U.S. $600 millions into its Argentine subsidiary following the crisis in that 
country (Economist Intelligence Unit Wire, December 16, 2003). Similarly, Portugal’s Banco Espiritu Santo 
injected more capital into its Brazilian subsidiary Banco Boavista Interatlantico, after the latter had to make good on 
the losses sustained by its mutual funds following the Real’s devaluation of January 1999. ABN Amro and KBC 
promised to make good on any losses to clients arising from an alleged fraud at their Hungarian subsidiary K&H 
equities (The Economist, September 2003).   
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activities and where regulation makes it difficult to establish new banks. Branches are, instead, 
more common in host countries with high corporate taxes ― possibly because of the greater ease 
allowed by this structure in shifting profits across borders ― and in poor countries, perhaps 
because of fewer market opportunities. 
Second, our results suggest that different organizational forms are associated with 
different degrees of penetration in the host market. Branches are more likely when foreign 
operations are smaller in size and do not have a retail orientation.  
Third, host-country risks matter, and in particular, economic and political risks have 
opposite effects. Branches are less common in countries with highly risky macroeconomic 
environments, where parent banks seem to prefer the shield of “hard” limited liability provided 
by subsidiaries to the “soft” protection of ring-fencing. However, when it comes to risks 
stemming from possible government intervention and other major political events, parent banks 
are more likely to operate as branches. This is not necessarily surprising. In view of legal 
provisions that shield parent banks from the liabilities of their foreign branches in events such as 
wars, insurrections, or arbitrary actions by foreign governments. Under such circumstances, 
banks are actually more exposed as subsidiaries, which typically have higher capital and reserve 
requirements and larger investments in local fixed assets relative to branches. 
The literature on banks’ organizational form has been scant. Our paper relates to early 
studies on the operations of international banks during the 1970s-1980s (see Goldberg and 
Saunders 1980; 1981a, b; Goldberg and Johnson 1990; Miller and Parkhe 1998, among others). 
However, these studies looked at the determinants of each type of organizational form in 
isolation and did not take into account banks’ decision to enter a given market.  
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A more recent body of literature has examined related aspects of the rising foreign bank 
presence in developing countries.
4 Several authors have analyzed the factors driving the decision 
of international banks to establish operations overseas and their choice of location during the 
1990s (see, for example, Claessens et al. 2000, Focarelli and Pozzolo 2001, Moshirian 2001, 
Buch and DeLong 2001, Buch 2000, Galindo, Micco and Serra 2003, Buch 2003, Buch and 
Lipponer 2004, Wezel 2004, Focarelli and Pozzolo 2006). Also, many studies have focused on 
the implications of foreign bank presence in developing countries. For example, Claessens et al. 
(2000), Barajas et al. (2000), Denizer (2000), and Martínez Pería and Mody (2004) study the 
effects on competition and efficiency in the banking sector. Dages et al. (2000), Peek and 
Rosengren (2000), and de Haas and Levyveld (2002, 2004) compare the lending behavior of 
foreign and domestic banks during crises. Berger et al. (2001), Mian (2004), and Clarke et al. 
(2005) study the consequences on access to finance and cherry picking. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the dataset 
collected on the activities of the top 100 banks and their operations in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. Section III presents the empirical methodology pursued in the paper to examine the 
determinants of foreign banks’ type of organizational form. Section IV discusses the empirical 
results. Section V concludes. 
 
II.   DATA 
To examine international banks’ type of organizational form across countries, we 
assembled an extensive and original database on the operations of the 100 largest banks in the 
                                                 
4 See Clarke et al. (2003) for a review of this literature.  
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world (according to the size of their global assets as of December 2002).
5 In particular, we focus 
on their presence in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
 6,7  
  Table 1 lists the top 100 commercial banks in the world, specifies their country of origin, 
and indicates the type of operations ― branch or subsidiary ― that these banks have (if any) in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe.
8 Also, to establish the degree to which each bank has 
international operations, we report the number of countries where each bank is present. On 
average, the top 100 banks have operations in more than 15 countries worldwide. Dutch banks 
have the highest country average, with operations in more than 38 countries. Also, a clear 
regional pattern emerges from this table. U.S. and Spanish banks are dominant in the Latin 
American region. German and Italian banks are the key players in Eastern and Central Europe. 
  The operations of these 100 banks capture most of the foreign bank activity in the host 
countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Table 2).
9 We define a foreign subsidiary as a 
locally incorporated bank with a foreign shareholder who owns at least 50% of the shares.
10 
                                                 
5 Among the top 100 banks, we did not include banks which were owned (50 percent or more of the shares) by 
another large bank. For example, Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG and Credit Lyonnais SA were not included in the 
top 100 list because their main shareholders as of 2002 were Bayerisque Hypo-un Vereisbank AG and Credit 
Agricole S, both in the top 100 list. The shareholder data structure was obtained from Bankscope.  
6 In Latin America, we examine international bank operations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. In Eastern Europe, we focus on Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, and Turkey. 
7 While it is possible that our sample selection might introduce certain biases, we believe these are unlikely to be 
relevant for at least two main reasons. First, since our sample covers the large majority of foreign banks operating in 
the countries considered, we are confident that limiting our sample to the top 100 banks will have little impact on the 
findings. Second, focusing on Latin America and Eastern Europe is justified by the fact that foreign presence in 
other parts of the world (most notably in Asia) has been very small until very recently. 
8 Branches operating in a country as a branch of a top 100 subsidiary incorporated in a developing country were 
coded as a subsidiary. The top 100 bank is under no legal obligation to honor those branches liabilities in excess of 
their developing country subsidiary.  
9 We eliminated Colombia from our sample because Colombian legislation does not allow the entry of foreign bank 
branches. 
10 There were only 5 cases in our sample in which a bank in the top 100 list had an equity participation below 50 
percent, so we believe that imposing the 50 percent ownership rule when identifying subsidiaries is not likely to bias 
our estimations. In other words, our sample does not exclude many cases of equity participations below the criteria 
used to identify subsidiaries.  
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Branches are, instead, not independently incorporated and fully owned by their foreign parent 
bank. 
Foreign-owned banks represent about 50 percent of the total number of banks in Latin 
America and Eastern and Central Europe. Those included in our sample capture more than 80 
percent of the assets controlled by all foreign banks, on average, across countries. Hungary, Peru 
and Bolivia are the exception, where the foreign banks in our sample account for less than 60 
percent of the assets of the foreign banks in the system, mainly because the biggest foreign banks 
in these countries are owned by banks from neighboring countries that are not among the world’s 
top 100 banks.
11 Overall, we capture 247 out of 387 foreign controlled institutions or about 65 
percent of the foreign operations in the countries in our sample.  
Among the banks in our sample with operations in Latin America and/or in Eastern 
Europe, there seems to be a preference for subsidiaries (Table 2), which account for 65% of the 
number of foreign bank operations in Latin America and for 82% of those in Eastern Europe. 
The operations of the top 100 banks by country of origin (or home-country) are shown in 
Table 3. It is clear that U.S., German, and Japanese banks are dominant both in terms of assets 
and number of institutions. There are 20 U.S. banks, 16 German banks, and 11 Japanese banks in 
the top 100 list. Regarding our sample of host countries, we observe that U.S. and German banks 
have operations in 15 out of the 20 host countries we consider. Italian and Dutch banks operate 
in 14 and 12 countries, respectively. The actual number of branches and subsidiaries in the host-
countries that make up our sample can also be observed in Table 2. U.S. banks have 26 
subsidiaries and 24 branches, followed by German banks with 42 subsidiaries and 6 branches.  
                                                 
11 Peru's low share data is more subtle and it is due to the importance of Banco de Crédito del Peru and Interbank's 
shareholders which are companies from Bermudas and Bahamas respectively.  
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Home- and host-country laws and regulations governing the activities of the affiliates of 
parent banks are likely to affect banks’ organizational form. A dummy summarizing home-
country regulation regarding the operations of their bank affiliates overseas is shown in the last 
column of Table 3. A value of 1 is associated with countries that place additional restrictions on 
opening branches relative to subsidiaries. For example, Canadian and Italian banks cannot open a 
branch without the previous approval of the home regulator.
12 Also, the Spanish regulator can 
refuse a bank’s application to open an overseas branch based on a wider set of criteria (e.g. legal 
or other type of obstacles that prevent or hamper the control and inspection of the branch by the 
home regulator) than in the case of opening a subsidiary.  
A summary of the regulatory treatment of branches versus subsidiaries by host regulators 
is shown in Table 4. Since there are more differences in host-country requirements for foreign 
branches and subsidiaries than in home-country regulations, we distinguish between four 
categories of requirements that we later combine into the Host-Country Regulation Index. In 
particular, we take into account the following separate requirements or restrictions:  Written 
Statements, Restrictions on Activities, Responsibilities Undertaken, and Other Restrictions. A 
value of one is associated with each category, where the host-country establishes more 
requirements for opening a foreign branch than for a foreign controlled subsidiary. The most 
common additional requirements are: the approval of the home-country foreign bank regulator, 
restrictions for some type of operations (e.g. mortgage transactions) or for operating with host-
country residents, and a statement of the applicant foreign bank that it will satisfy all claims of 
the branch that may arise.  
                                                 
12 Italian legislation does not include EU Member States on this issue.  
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Among the host countries in our sample, regulations for Croatia, Hungary, and Poland 
discriminate the most against foreign branches. Most notably, the first two countries place 
restrictions on the type of activities that branches can undertake relative to subsidiaries. With the 
exception of Mexico (where branches can only operate with non-residents), such restrictions 
appear to be uncommon in Latin America.  
 
III.   EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
We model a bank’s organizational form according to equation (1) below: 
 
Organizational Formi,j,k= α0 + β1Parent Bank Characteristicsi,j + 
β2Home-Country Regulationsj+ β3Affiliate Bank Characteristicsi,j,k +  
β4 Host-Country Factorsk+εi,j,k   (1) 
 
where Organizational Formi,j,k is a dummy equal to 1 if parent bank i from home-country j has a 
branch in host-country k, and 0 if it operates a subsidiary in that country.  
Among the Parent Bank Characteristics we control for the size, business orientation and 
international strategy of each parent bank. Parent Bank Size refers to the log of the total parent 
bank assets. This data comes from Bankscope. Parent Bank Business Orientation is a dummy 
that equals one if the bank has a retail orientation and zero if the bank is primarily engaged in 
wholesale or investment bank activities. The sources for this classification are Bankscope and the 
home banks’ WebPages. Parent Bank Internationalization Strategy refers to the ratio of branches 
to total foreign operations that the parent bank owns. This variable helps determine whether the  
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parent has a clear preference for one type of organizational form or the other. The Bankers’ 
Almanac is the source used to construct this variable. 
Home-Country Regulations refers to restrictions placed by home regulators from country 
j on parent banks’ organizational form. In particular, it measures restrictions to open branches 
relative to subsidiaries. This dummy was constructed on the basis of the information gathered 
from laws and regulations in the parent countries. More details on this dummy can be seen in 
Table 3. 
We also control for several characteristics of the affiliate bank. Affiliate Bank Size refers 
to the size of the local affiliate in the host-country, as measured by the number of employees.
13 
This data comes mainly from Bankscope and Bankers’ Almanac. Affiliate Bank Business 
Orientation is a dummy equal to 1 if the affiliate bank has a retail business orientation. The 
dummy is zero in the case of trade finance and corporative and investment banks. This data come 
from Bankscope, Bankers’ Almanac and individual banks’ WebPages. We also include a dummy 
(labeled Acquisition Dummy) for whether the bank is a greenfield operation (0) or the result of an 
acquisition (1). Finally, we control for the year in which the affiliate was established (Year-of-
entry). Information to construct both of these variables was obtained from numerous sources 
such as central banks, banks WebPages, Bankers’ Almanac and Bankscope.  
Host-Country Factors include measures of banking regulations, corporate taxation, 
country size, level of development and risk. Among the host country banking regulations, Host-
Country Bank Entry Requirements is an index that takes values from 0 to 8, depending on the 
number of legal submissions required to obtain a license to operate as a bank in the host-country. 
                                                 
13 We use size as measured by employees because data on assets for branches was lacking in many cases given that 
balance sheets are typically consolidated at the parent level.   
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These requirements may include none, all or some of the following: (1) draft by laws, (2) 
intended organizational chart, (3) first 3-year financial projections, (4) financial information on 
main potential shareholders, (5) background/experience of future directors, (6) background 
experience of future managers, (7) sources of funds to capitalize new bank and (8) intended 
differentiation of new bank from others. This index is constructed using the data collected and 
methodology proposed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001).  
Host-Country Restrictions on Bank Activities is also an index developed by Barth et al. 
(2001). This index, ranging between 1 to 16, tries to capture the extent to which banks can 
engage in (a) the business of securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the 
mutual fund industry, (b) insurance underwriting and selling, (c) real estate investment, 
development and management, and (d) whether banks can own non-financial firms. For each of 
these subcategories, a value between 1 and 4 is assigned depending on whether the activity is 
unrestricted (1), permitted (2), restricted (3), or prohibited (4).   
Host-Country Regulations on Foreign Bank Branches refers to an index that captures the 
degree to which the host-country restricts the operation of foreign banks as branches in the 
country, relative to its treatment of foreign subsidiaries. This variable was constructed on the 
basis of 2002 bank regulations and legislation in each of the twenty host countries. Details on 
this index are shown on Table 4.  
Host-Country Corporate Taxes refers to the top corporate tax rate in the host-country as 
reported by the Heritage Foundation. Host-Country Size is measured by the log of constant dollar 
GDP in the host-country. This variable is intended to capture the scope for scale economies in 
the country. Host-Country GDP per capita, measured as the dollar GDP per capita, is included to 
capture the degree of economic development in the host-country. This variable may also help to  
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measure business opportunities in the host-country. Data for both of these variables comes from 
the World Development Indicators produced by the World Bank. 
Host-Country Risk refers to four different types of host-country risk indexes reported by 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG in its country risk index.
14). These variables are 
Economic Risk, Political Risk, Investment Profile Risk, and Country Risk (composite index). The 
Economic Risk rating assesses a country’s economic strength or weakness as a function of 
variables such as the country’s GDP per capita, real GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget 
balance, and current account balance.
15 The Political Risk rating provides a summary of the 
degree of political stability in each host country. Investment Profile Risk, a subcomponent of the 
Political Risk index, takes into account factors such as contract viability, profits repatriation, 
payments delays measurements, etc. that affect those who invest in the host country. Finally, the 
Country Risk is a composite index that includes both economic and political risk variables and 
other variables such as exchange rate stability and total foreign debt as percent of GDP. We 
change the sign on these variables from how ICRG reports them, so that higher values indicate 
greater potential risk.  
  The type of organizational form explained by equation (1) can only be observed for a 
given host-country once the parent bank decides to establish operations in that country. Thus, in 
estimating equation (1) there might be a selection bias, unless we also consider how parent banks 
make decisions on where to establish foreign operations. We take this into account by estimating 
a Heckman probit model where the first stage or selection equation is modeled following 
                                                 
14 This index is defined by ICRG so that higher values mean less risk, but in our estimations we reverse the sign on 
this variable to give it the more intuitive interpretation that higher values mean more risk. 
15 Although the ICRG Economic Risk index includes the host-country GDP per capita as a subcomponent, the 
correlation coefficient between the ICRG Economic Risk index and host-country GDP per capita variables is very 
low in our sample.   
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Foreign Bank Presencei,j,k=  α0 + β1 Parent Bank Characteristicsi,j + β2  Home-Country       
Regulationsj+  β3 Affiliate Bank Characteristicsi + β4 Host-Country Factorsk+ Home-Host 
Proximityj,k+ εi , j , k            (2) 
 
where Foreign Bank Presencei,j,k is a dummy equal to 1 if parent bank i from home-country j has 
any kind of operations in host-country k, and 0 if it does not have a presence in the host-country. 
Most variables included in equation (2) have been defined above, with the following three 
exceptions. First, within the parent bank characteristics, Parent Bank Worldwide Activity takes 
into account the number of countries worldwide where each parent bank has activities (data 
source: Bankers’ Almanac). Second, among the regulatory variables, Host-Country (inward) 
Foreign Investment Regulation and Home-Country (outward) Foreign Investment Regulation 
capture government controls on inward and outward direct investment in banking, respectively. 
Both variables are constructed as a five year average (2002-1998) from original IMF data.
17 
Finally,  Home-Host Proximity is a matrix of variables that capture the degree of economic, 
cultural, and institutional affinity between the home and host countries. In particular, it includes 
separate dummies for whether the host and home-country share (i) a common language and (ii) a 
                                                 
16 An alternative approach would be to estimate a nested logit model where the first decision level is to enter a 
country or not and the second is whether to operate as a branch or as a subsidiary. The problem with this approach is 
that we could not study the impact of affiliate characteristics on the second level decision because these factors are 
not observed for cases when a bank has no operations in a given host. Despite of this limitation, results on the 
remaining variables, available upon request, yielded very similar findings to those reported here. 
17 The original IMF data are dummies which equal 1 in those years when the countries had controls.  
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common legal origin. Also, the matrix includes the share of bilateral trade between countries and 
a measure of geographical distance between home and host countries, measured in miles. We 
also included a dummy for whether the home and host where in a colonial relationship or 




IV.   RESULTS 
Table 5 reports the results for the probit estimation of equation 1.
19 We present six 
alternative specifications including different proxies for political and economic risk. All 
regressions are estimated with robust standard errors allowing for the possibility that 
observations for the same parent bank may not be independent (i.e., we allow for clustered 
standard errors within parent banks). 
Most coefficients are significant and have the expected sign. Since results are robust 
across specifications, in what follows we focus on our baseline regression labeled model (4).  
The results can be summarized as follows. First, regulations matter. The variables describing 
host- and home-country restrictions on foreign branches both have the expected negative sign 
and are significant in all specification (often at the 1 percent level), indicating that more 
restrictions on branches lower the probability that banks adopt this organizational form. Host-
                                                 
18 The variables included in the first stage equation (or equation (2) above) of the Heckman model that are not 
included in the equation for the organization form (equation (1)) are the exclusion restrictions which allow 
identification of the Heckman probit model. We tried a number of variations on these, and results remained largely 
unchanged. Furthermore, in separate probit estimations, available upon request, we verified that those variables 
included in the selection equation did not affect the second stage equation (i.e., the type of organizational form). 
19 Note the sample size, which captures the number of bank affiliates (both branches and subsidiaries) drops to 240 
observations instead of 247 as shown in table 2, because of missing data for 5 Brazilian banks (all investment 
banks), one Mexican, and one Polish.  
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country bank entry requirements, which capture the number of procedures required to license a 
bank, also have a negative, although less consistently significant, effect on the establishment of 
branches. One possible explanation for this result is that while branches are typically de-novo 
operations, banks can circumvent entry requirements by setting up subsidiaries through the 
purchase of domestic institutions. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that the acquisition 
dummy is always significant and has a negative sign.
20 Host-country restrictions on bank 
activities do not seem, instead, to have a significant impact on the organizational form adopted 
by foreign banks. This is not necessarily surprising since these restrictions typically apply to both 
locally- and foreign-incorporated banks. 
Second, taxation matters. The coefficient of the host-country top corporate tax rate is 
positive and highly significant in all regressions. Thus, branches ─ having an advantage in 
shifting profits across border ─ are more likely in countries with relatively higher corporate 
taxes.  
Third, risk matters; suggesting that differences in parent banks’ responsibility for the 
liabilities of branches and subsidiaries play an important role in the organizational form of the 
affiliates. Under normal circumstances, parents face full responsibility vis-à-vis the liabilities of 
branches, but their exposure is limited to the loss of the equity invested in the case of 
subsidiaries. Consistent with these differences in the legal treatment, we find that banks are more 
likely to operate as branches in host-countries characterized by relatively low economic risk. The 
coefficient of the proxy for economic risk is negative and significant, suggesting that, in 
countries with a highly risky macroeconomic environment, parent banks prefer the shield of 
                                                 
20 We also attempted to look at this hypothesis by adding an interaction term between entry restrictions and the 
acquisition dummy but, due to multicollinearity with the individual variables that make up the interaction term, this 
interaction term had to be dropped. Nevertheless, we thank Alberto Pozzolo for the suggestion.  
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“hard” limited liability provided by subsidiaries to the “soft” protection of ring-fencing. 
However, the coefficients on the political risk proxy and on the measure of investment risk 
(capturing risk to the viability of contracts, the risk of expropriation, and potential obstacles to 
the repatriation of profits), are instead positive and significant, although to a lesser extent. This 
suggests that when it comes to risks stemming from possible government intervention and other 
major political events (such as civil unrest or wars), parent banks prefer to operate as branches, 
since the latter are often protected against such events by ring fencing provisions.
21,22 In other 
words, in view of legal provisions that shield parent banks from the liabilities of their foreign 
branches in events such as wars, insurrections, or actions by foreign governments, banks are in 
such occasions less exposed as branches than as subsidiaries, which typically have higher capital 
and reserve requirements and larger investments in local fixed assets.  
Fourth, size matters. Our results suggest that different organizational forms are associated 
with different degrees of penetration in a foreign market on the part of the parent bank. Branches 
are more likely when foreign operations are smaller in size. The link between the degree of 
penetration and a lower probability of being a branch is reinforced by the negative and 
significant coefficient of the dummy indicating that the affiliate is a retail bank. The coefficient 
of affiliate year-of-entry is positive and significant, suggesting that there has been a recent trend 
by foreign banks to increasingly penetrate emerging markets by operating as subsidiaries.  
A related finding is that branches are less likely in relatively richer countries: the host-
country’s per capita income has a negative and significant coefficient. This may in part reflect 
                                                 
21 The opposite sign associated with economic and political risk explains why the ICRG country composite risk 
index in model (1) is not significant. 
22 We also tried looking at the interaction of affiliate size and political risk but we could not add this variable due to 
multicollinearity with the individual variables which make up this interaction term that are already included in the 
regressions. This is due to the fact that while the variability in affiliate size is significant, the same is not true for our 
measure of political risk, so that the interaction term is highly collinear with size.  
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the fact that subsidiaries are often the result of crisis-related acquisitions which are more likely to 
occur in poorer countries. However, this cannot be the entire story as major crises have occurred 
also in relatively richer emerging market economies. One additional explanation may be that 
foreign banks enter as subsidiaries in markets where they believe there is ample room for 
expansion, and these are typically poorer economies where the local banks are less developed 
and capitalized, and hence easier to compete against.  
Finally, one additional result worth noting is that: parent banks seem to specialize, at least 
to some extent, in one organizational form or the other, beyond what is explained by their home-
country regulation. Indeed, the worldwide ratio of branches-to-subsidiaries at the parent bank is 
positive and highly significant. One possible explanation for this finding is that the two 
organizational forms require different expertise and corporate governance design at the parent 
level. However, the coefficients of the dummy indicating that the parent institution is a retail 
bank and that of its size are not significant, suggesting that the business orientation and overall 
size of the parent bank itself are not important when it comes to the organizational form of its 
foreign operations.
23 Possibly, the reason why parent size seems not to matter can be ascribed to 
the fact that all parent banks in our sample are pretty large, with assets ranging from 
USD$1,097,190 millions (Citigroup Inc) to USD$94,325 millions (Bank of China, Hong Kong).  
In Table 6, we measure the economic impact of a change in our explanatory variables by 
considering what happens to the predicted probability of the affiliate being a branch when each 
right hand side variable increases from its sample average by one standard deviation (for the 
dummy variables we consider a change from 0 to 1). Among the taxation and regulatory 
                                                 
23 The lack of significance of the parent bank size is another reason why we think that limiting our sample to the 100 
top largest banks in the world is not likely to be introducing a bias in our estimations.  
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variables, corporate taxes, and restrictions on foreign branches in the host-country have the 
largest impact: a one-standard-deviation increase (decrease) from the average in corporate taxes 
(restrictions on branches) increases the likelihood that the foreign bank will operate as a branch 
by about 3.5 percentage points. The economic effect of the other regulatory variables is around 
1.5 percentage points. Among the bank-specific factors, the affiliate bank size has the largest 
impact: a one-standard-deviation increase in affiliate size reduces the likelihood that the affiliate 
will be a branch by almost 6 percentage points. Year-of-entry and the acquisition dummy are 
also important with impacts around 4.5 percentage points. In particular, an increase in both 
variables (by one standard deviation in the first case and from 0 to 1 in the case of the acquisition 
dummy) lowers the likelihood that the affiliate will be a branch by 4.5 percentage points.   
Finally, the relative importance of country risk is comparable to that of regulations, with impacts 
at about 4.3 and 3.2 percentage points for the political risk and the economic risk measures, 
respectively. A one–standard-deviation increase in political risk raises the likelihood that the 
foreign affiliate will operate as a branch by 4.3 percentage points, while a one-standard-deviation 
increase in economic risk, lowers this probability by 3.2 percentage points. 
Results for the Heckman probit estimation are shown in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 shows the 
first stage of the Heckman estimation, where we model the decision of banks to operate/have a 
presence in a given host-country (this corresponds to the model labeled equation (2) above). Our 
estimations yield results consistent with many of the previous studies on this issue, but also offer 
some new insights. In particular, we show that banks are less likely to have operations in 
countries where political risk is high. Also, once we control for the market opportunities in the 
host-country, economic risk does not seem to matter if we do not control for political risk and it 
is positive when we control for the latter. We interpret the positive coefficient on economic risk  
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to be associated with the fact that much of the recent foreign bank entry has occurred following 
economic crises in the host countries, since these events provide opportunities for “good deals” 
in terms of acquiring local banks. Finally, like previous studies we find that regulation and 
taxation have a negative impact on foreign bank presence, while economic and cultural 
proximity to the host promote presence. 
Table 8 shows the results for second stage in the Heckman model, i.e., the likelihood of a 
parent bank choosing to operate as a branch. These results are very similar (and almost identical 
in terms of significance) to those for the simple probit model without controlling for sample 
selection. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, they are not discussed here. Furthermore, the tests of 
independence of the first (selection) and second stage equations reported at the bottom of Table 8 
reveal that we can accept the null of independence, which means that we can take the probit 
results to be consistent and not affected by selection bias. This also explains why the Heckman 
second stage results are almost identical to those obtained in the probit estimations shown on 
Table 5.  
 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
Our study of the determinants of foreign banks’ organizational form yielded three main findings. 
First, there is evidence that political and economic risk matters for how banks enter new markets, 
suggesting that the different degree of parent bank responsibility vis-à-vis the liabilities of 
branches and subsidiaries plays an important role in the decision. Second, different 
organizational forms correspond to different degrees of penetration by a parent bank to a foreign 
market. Third, factors such as home- and host-country regulation and taxation also matter.  
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From a policy perspective, our results point to two main conclusions. First, since risk matters, 
parent banks should be expected to behave differently vis-à-vis branches and subsidiaries in 
times of economic and political crisis. Second, since regulatory variables have non-marginal 
effects on the form of foreign bank entry, governments can design regulations to favor one 
structure rather than another. Policy makers concerned with the behavior of foreign banks during 
periods of financial distress may want to favor branches to tap into the deep pockets of their 
parents. However, the results indicate that subsidiaries are more likely to enter retail markets and 
establish large local networks. Hence, a trade-off emerges. While favoring branches may be 
optimal from the point of view of systemic economic risk management, regulation discouraging 
foreign banks from establishing local subsidiaries may limit the benefits of foreign bank 
operations. We leave the analysis of this trade-off to future research.   
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1 Citigroup Inc US 78 B B B, S B B S S B S S B S S B B
2 Mizuho Financial Group JP 25
3 UBS AG CH 28 S
4 Sumitomo Mitsui JP 16 S
5 Deutsche Bank AG DE 48 S S S B S B S (2) S(2)
(a)
6 Mitsubishi Tokyo Fin. Group JP 33 B S B B S
7 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. US 50 B B, S B B B
8 HSBC Holdings Plc UK 63 S S (2) B B S 
(a)
S (2) S S
9 ING Group NV NL 37 B B B B S B S B B
10 BNP Paribas FR 48 B,S S S S S S S
11 Credit Suisse Group CH 33 S (2) B B
12 Bank Of America US 30 B S B S
13 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 19
14 UFJ Holdings Inc JP 17
15 Barclays Holding Plc UK 41 S
16 Credit Agricole CA FR 47 S S S S (2) S B,S S (2)
17 ABN AMRO Bank NL 59 B S (2) S S B B S B B
18 Industrial & Com. Bank of China CN 8
19 HBOS Plc UK 9
20 Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG DE 25 S S S (2) S (2) S S B S (3) S S
21 Morgan Stanley US 24 S
22 Societe Generale FR 46 S S S S B S S B
23 Norinchukin Bank (The) JP 3
24 Fortis BE 22 S
25 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. US 9 S SS
26 Commerzbank AG DE 22 B S S (2)
27 General Electric Capital Corp. US 13 S S S S S S
28 Bank of CN CN 20
29 Dresdner Bank AG DE 26 B,S S S S S S
30 Rabobank Group NL 19 S S
31 China Construction Bank CN 4
32 Dexia BE 13 S
33 Agricultural Bank of China CN 2
34 NRW.BANK (WestLB) DE 18 S S S B
35 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc US 6 S
36 Wells Fargo & Company US 8
37 DZ Bank AG DE 13 SS
38 Wachovia Corporation US 5
39 Resona Holdings, Inc JP 6
40 Bayerische Landesbank DE 5 S S
41 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc UK 23 B B, S S B B
42 Santander Central Hispano Group ES 24 S S S (4) S S S (2) S S
43 Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg DE 6
44 KfW Group DE 0
45 Prudential Financial Inc US 1
46 Banca Intesa SpA IT 19 S (3) B S S (4) S 
(a)
S S S (2) B
47 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria  ES 21 S S (3) S S S (2) S S
48 Abbey National Plc UK 1
49 Bank One Corporation US 8 B
50 Washington Mutual Inc. US 0
This table contains information about the top 100 international commercial banks, classified by assets as of 2002. B stands for Branch. S stands for Subsidiary; S(#) indicates the number of subsidiaries in the country.
Countries codes used: AT = Austria; AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; CH = Switzerland; CN = China; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; ES = Spain; FR = France; HK = Hong Kong; IE = Ireland; IT =
Italy; KP = Korea; JP = Japan; NL = Netherlands; SE = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; US =USA.
(a) One branch operating in the country was coded as a subsidiary because it was a branch of a subsidiary of one of










































































































































































































































51 Almanij BE 24 B S (2) S S S(2)
(a)
52 Credit Mutuel Centre Est Europe FR 10
53 CDC Ixis FR 0
54 Nordea Bank AB SE 14 B B B S
55 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. US 16
56 Danske Bank A/S DK 8 S
57 Eurohypo AG DE 8
58 Royal Bank of CA RBC CA 10
59 UniCredito Italiano SpA IT 19 S S (3) S S S S
60 Shinkin Central Bank JP 2
61 San Paolo IMI IT 18 SS
62 HSH Nordbank AG - Proforma DE 8
63 National AU Bank AU 9
64 NORD/LB DE 11 SS S
65 Fleet National Bank US 12 B B, S B S B B B, S
66 Bear Stearns Companies Inc. US 4
67 Bank of Nova Scotia (The) CA 30 S S
68 Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG DE 5 S
69 US Bancorp US 0
70 Nomura Holdings Inc JP 7
71 Toronto Dominion Bank CA 7
72 Canadian Imperial Bank of Com. CA 12
73 Banque de Montreal CA 6
74 Kookmin Bank KP 5
75 American Express Company US 28 S S (2) B S
76 CNCEP FR 1
77 Landesbank Hessen- HELABA DE 4
78 Deutsche Postbank AG DE 2
79 Depfa Bank Plc IE 5
80 Capitalia SpA IT 12 B
81 Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co JP 5
82 National Agricultural Coop. Fed. KP 0
83 Svenska Handelsbanken SE 2 S
84 Natexis Banques Populaires FR 12
85 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena IT 9
86 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken  SE 12 S S S
87 Commonwealth Bank of AU AU 9
88 Erste Bank der Oesterreichischen S. AT 8 S (2) S (2) S S
89 Chuo Mitsui Trust & Banking Co  JP 0
90 National City Corporation US 2
91 SunTrust Banks, Inc. US 1
92 BHW Holdings AG DE 0
93 Standard Chartered Plc UK 43 S B
94 LA CAIXA (Barcelona) ES 2
95 Shoko Chukin Bank, Ltd JP 0
96 Foereningssparbanken SE 8 S S S
97 State Bank of India IN 14
98 Westpac Banking Corporation AU 11
99 Woori Financial Holdings Co. Ltd KP 10
100 Bank of China (HK) Limited HK 2
Sources: Bankscope, National Central Banks, and Bankers Almanac.
This table contains information about the top 100 international commercial banks, classified by assets as of 2002. B stands for Branch. S stands for Subsidiary; S(#) indicates the number of subsidiaries in the country.
Countries codes used: AT = Austria; AU = Australia; BE = Belgium; CA = Canada; CH = Switzerland; CN = China; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; ES = Spain; FR = France; HK = Hong Kong; IE = Ireland; IT =
Italy; KP = Korea; JP = Japan; NL = Netherlands; SE = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; US =USA.
(a) One branch operating in the country was coded as a subsidiary because it was a branch of a subsidiary of one of
the top 100 banks operating in a developing country.Countries
Number of 
Banks


















Top 100 Foreign Banks' 
Asset Share Within Foreign 
Controlled Banks
d)
Argentina 79 30 15 15 10 10 89.99%
Bolivia 12 5 2 3 1 1 58.79%
Brazil 193 73 64 9 38 6 91.14%
Bulgaria 34 21 15 6 4 2 40.61%
Chile 25 14 6 8 6 6 97.70%
Croatia 46 21 21 0 13 0 75.16%
Czech Republic 37 26 17 9 13 5 84.74%
Ecuador 22 2 0 2 0 2 100.00%
Estonia 7 4 3 1 2 1 92.30%
Hungary 39 25 25 0 15 0 60.56%
Latvia 23 9 8 1 4 1 87.55%
Lithuania 13 8 5 3 4 2 92.78%
Mexico 33 21 11 10 10 10 99.72%
Peru 15 12 9 3 4 3 52.43%
Poland
e) 59 45 44 1 29 1 79.25%
Slovak Republic 20 17 15 2 11 1 75.16%
Slovenia 22 7 6 1 3 0 77.86%
Turkey 54 19 8 11 4 9 94.35%
Uruguay 41 28 18 10 11 5 77.17%
TOTAL 774 387 292 95 182 65 -
Table 2:  Foreign Bank Presence in Eastern Europe and Latin America
Sources: National Central Banks, Bankers Almanac, Bankscope, and Others.
a) Foreign banks with at least 50% of the bank capital; b) Number of subsidiaries under foreign banks' control whose parent banks are within the top 100
worldwide banks, classified by assets at 2002; c) Number of foreign branches whose parent banks are within the top 100 worldwide banks, classified by assets at
2002 - 4 branches in the sample of Top 100 subsidiaries incorporated in a developing country were classified as subsidiaries; d) Figures for Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic and Uruguay underestimate the representativeness of the foreign banks in the sample due to missing asset data.
Bulgaria's low foreign asset share is due to the important participation of banks from Greece and Hungary which are not classified within the top 100 banks.
Peru's low foreign asset share data is due to the importance of Banco de Credito del Peru and Interbank's shareholders which are companies from Bermuda and
Bahamas respectively. Finally, Bolivia's low asset share is due to the importance of Banco de Credito de Bolivia whose main shareholder is Banco de Credito del
Peru; and e) It does not include 605 cooperatives banks (They represent 6.5% of total assets)  Table 3 -  Top 100 Parent Bank Activities by Country of Origin (Home) and Home Country Regulations on Overseas Activities
Countries
Number of Top 100 
Banks by Assets in 
2002
Assets' Share Among 
Top 100 Banks
Number of Top 100 
Banks with Operations 
in Sample of Host 
Countries





Sample of Host 
Countries
Number of Branches 





Australia 3 1.26% 0 0000
Austria 1 0.37% 1 4600
Belgium 3 3.32% 3 5810
Canada 5 2.70% 1 2 2 0 1
(a)
China 4 5.10% 0 0 0 0 0
*
Denmark 1 0.72% 1 1100
France 7 7.90% 3 11 22 4 0
Germany 16 14.97% 8 15 42 6 1
(b)
Hong Kong 1 0.28% 0 0000
India 1 0.31% 0 0 0 0 1
(c)
Ireland 1 0.45% 0 0000
Italy 5 2.94% 4 14 23 3 1
(d)
Japan 11 14.55% 2 5330
Korea 3 1.16% 0 0000
Netherlands 3 5.06% 3 12 8 12 0
Spain 3 2.14% 2 8 20 0 1
(e)
Sweden 4 1.88% 4 4830
Switzerland 2 4.50% 2 3320
United Kingdom 6 9.81% 4 11 10 7 0
United States 20 20.57% 10 15 26 24 0
Total 100 100.00% 48 20 182 65 -
Notes: The Home Country Branch/Sub Regulation Dummy is equal to zero if the legal requirements for a branch are the same as for a subsidiary. Instead, it is equal to one if there are
more requirements for a branch than for a subsidiary. The references to each case with 1 can be found below. Note that none of the host countries in the sample were EU members in
2002.
(a) No bank shall have any branch, other than a representative office, outside Canada, without the approval of the Minister, whose approval may be subject to such terms and conditions
as the Minister considers appropriate (Banking Act, art 422). 
(b) An institution shall report immediately to the Federal Banking Supervisory Office and the Deutsche Bundesbank, the establishment, relocation and closure of a branch in a non-
EEA state (Banking Act, art 24 (7)). 
(c) Overseas Branches should not rely substantially on borrowed funds for asset expansion above the tolerance level ( Instruction of RBI for Banks &Banking Operations: Chapter 17,
paragraph 17.1 (viii)). Numerous ceilings to individual borrowers and the exposure of branches overseas ( Instruction of RBI for Banks &Banking Operations: Chapter 17, paragraph
17.3). In depth and detailed "reviews" of the working of the overseas branches in each country at reasonable intervals of not more than a year and put the reviews for the consideration
of the Top management and the Board of Directors ( Instruction of RBI for Banks &Banking Operations: Chapter 17, paragraph 17.11 (v)).
(d) Italian banks may establish branches in a non-member state, subject to authorization by the Bank of Italy. Italian banks may establish branches in Italy and in other member states
(Banking Act, art 15(2)).
(e) If it is intended to open the branch in a non-EU Member State, the Banco de España can refuse the application on the basis of, and in addition to the foregoing reasons, the fact that
it considers that the activity of the branch is not going to be subject to effective control by the supervisory authorities of the host country, or that there exists legal or some other kind of
obstacles that prevent or hamper control and inspection of the branch by the Banco de España . (Real Decreto 1245/1995, art 13)
* China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was officially launched on April 28, 2003. Before it was regulated by the PBOC (People's Bank of China). The main banks are state
banks. No legislation was found for that period.









































Notes: This table explains how the Host Country Regulation Index was constructed. The index was developed using four subcategories: Required
Written Statements, Restrictions on Activities, Responsibilities Undertaken and Other Restrictions. Each category is equal to zero if the legal
requirements for a branch are the same as for a subsidiary. They are equal to one if there are more requirements for a branch than for a subsidiary. An
explanation when each subcomponent equals 1 can be found below.  Source:  Host Countries' Banking Sector Regulations
(a) Written approval of bank supervisory body of country of domicile required to open a bank branch (Law of Financial Institutions, art 17 (1))
(b) Written approval of bank supervisory body of country of domicile required for opening a bank branch (Law of Banks, art 12). Also written
statement of the bank's supervisory body agreeing exchange of information and prompt notification of news to the Bulgarian authorities (Regulation 2,
section II).
(c) (Among others) An opinion or approval of the supervisory authority of a bank of a Member State or the supervisory authority of a foreign bank on a
bank that intends to establish a bank in the Republic of Croatia. (Banking Law, art 35)
(d) A branch office of Foreign banks shall not perform the activities determined by the provisions of Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Banking Act (e.g.
receive deposits, etc). Special conditions for operating a branch office of foreign banks shall be regulated by Croatia National Bank (Banking Act, art
21)
(e) A branch may conduct operations within the Republic of Croatia pursuant to the authorization of the founder bank and with the implicit
responsibility of the founder bank for all obligations undertaken in the Republic of Croatia in relation to the operations of the branch. (Banking Law, art
51)
(f) Unless otherwise provided for by an international agreement, the Government may, based on a law or an authorization granted by law, prescribe by
decree that only economic organizations with business offices registered in Hungary or organizations under full or majority ownership of domestic
residents may be entitled to perform certain activities. (Branch Act, section 8)
(g) A branch office may be entered in the company registration records if an international agreement concluded with the country, or international
organization, where the registered office, in which the foreign company is located, allows the foreign company to establish a branch office in Hungary.
(Branch Act, section 5) From 1 January 1998, The Branch Act recognizes and authorizes for the first time the "branch" as a legal form of establishment
in Hungary.
(h) The Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit may authorize the establishment in the Republic of branches of pre-eminent foreign banks, whose
borrowing and lending operations may be conducted only with residents outside Mexico. (Law of Credit Institutions, art 7)
(i) The application shall have appended thereto an undertaking from the applicant foreign bank that it will satisfy all claims on the branch that may arise
from its relations with other organizations. (Banking act, art40 (3))
(j) The Commission for Banking Supervision stated in a debate that the most appropriate form of foreign organization in the baking business in Poland
would be a joint-stock bank (source: The Polish Banking System in the Nineties, National Bank of Poland, December 2001) The authorization of the
Commission for Banking Supervision is a requirement for the establishment of a branch of a foreign bank (Banking Act, art 40)
(k) A branch of a foreign bank may only be permitted mortgage transactions if the foreign bank applying for the license has a license to perform
mortgage transactions in the home country.(Banking Act, art 8(9))Table 5: Probit Estimation of the Likelihood that a Foreign Bank Operates as a Branch
Parent Bank  3.2184 3.2301 3.2417 3.2423 3.3866 3.3889
Internationalization Strategy (1.2427) *** (1.2898) ** (1.2018) *** (1.2685) ** (1.3389) ** (1.3096) ***
-0.3850 -0.4297 -0.2856 -0.3066 -0.3982 -0.3055
(0.2384) (0.2439) * (0.2348) (0.2612) (0.2506) (0.3026)
Parent Bank  0.7049 0.7855 0.4869 0.4520 0.6776 0.4740
Business Orientation (0.5195) (0.5177) (0.5257) (0.5494) (0.5222) (0.5361)
Home Country Regulations  -0.7429 -0.7475 -0.8104 -0.8473 -0.7094 -0.7671
on Overseas Branches (0.3003) ** (0.2927) ** (0.2972) *** (0.2990) *** (0.2921) ** (0.3026) **
-0.2540 -0.2675 -0.2772 -0.3061 -0.2954 -0.3127
(0.1495) * (0.1650) (0.1457) * (0.1677) * (0.1628) * (0.1588) **
Affiliate Bank -0.8470 -0.8757 -0.8758 -0.9615 -0.8226 -0.8351
Business Orientation (0.3493) ** (0.3406) *** (0.3398) *** (0.3197) *** (0.3290) ** (0.3246) ***
-0.0314 -0.0307 -0.0346 -0.0350 -0.0313 -0.0339
(0.0059) *** (0.0054) *** (0.0060) *** (0.0054) *** (0.0052) *** (0.0055) ***
-1.5348 -1.5202 -1.8709 -1.9289 -1.7893 -2.1227
(0.3176) *** (0.3585) *** (0.4207) *** (0.4641) *** (0.4598) *** (0.5837) ***
Host Country Regulations -0.8380 -0.4418 -1.3679 -0.7232 -0.6198 -1.1366
on Foreign Bank Branches (0.3156) *** (0.2454) * (0.3315) *** (0.2919) ** (0.1999) *** (0.4189) ***
Host Country Bank -0.2775 -0.2230 -0.4009 -0.3381 -0.3566 -0.4776
Entry Requirements (0.1863) (0.1859) (0.1940) ** (0.2084) (0.2142) * (0.2187) **
Host Country Restrictions 0.1186 0.1986 0.0121 0.1336 0.1659 0.0525
on Bank Activities (0.1153) (0.1163) * (0.1017) (0.1246) (0.1187) (0.1306)
Host Country 0.0703 0.0581 0.1020 0.0894 0.0899 0.1191
Corporate Taxes (0.0242) *** (0.0199) *** (0.0309) *** (0.0245) *** (0.0265) *** (0.0325) ***
-0.0294 -0.1465 0.0924 -0.0909 -0.1640 -0.0317
(0.1363) (0.1276) (0.0974) (0.1007) (0.1130) (0.1159)
Host Country GDP -0.4807 -0.3864 -0.5343 -0.3008 -0.5905 -0.6198
per Capita (0.1308) *** (0.1328) *** (0.1354) *** (0.1341) ** (0.1259) *** (0.1385) ***





(0.0556) ** (0.0668) *** (0.0638) *
0.2721 0.2503
(0.1203) ** (0.1356) *
0.119648 0.0498 -0.1245 -0.5797 0.2952 0.0216
(0.3585) (0.3588) (0.3910) (0.4333) (0.3978) (0.4477)
Number of Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
Pseudo R-squared 0.576 0.5828 0.5884 0.6136 0.5865 0.5968
Wald chi2 114.670 116.900 108.490 194.960 121.210 126.480
P-value of Wald chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports probit regressions with standard error adjusted for clustering on each parent bank. A constant is estimated but not reported. 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** mean significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Host Country                        
Investment Risk 
Affiliate Bank Size
Host Country                         
Political Risk







Independent Variables Dependent variable: Branch=1 ; Subsidiary=0
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Host Country Economic Risk
Host Country Political Risk
Affiliate Bank Size
Year of Entry
Host Country SizeTable 7: 1
st Stage Heckman Probit Estimations of the Likelihood that a Foreign Bank Operates in a Host Country
Independent Variables
Parent Bank Worldwide Activity 0.0361 0.0362 0.0361 0.0359 0.0361 0.0360
(0.0052) *** (0.0053) *** (0.0052) *** (0.0052) *** (0.0052) *** (0.0052) ***
0.1303 0.1277 0.1340 0.1400 0.1347 0.1362
(0.1506) (0.1511) (0.1503) (0.1533) (0.1513) (0.1507)
Parent Bank Business Orientation 0.1371 0.1330 0.1416 0.1465 0.1389 0.1421
(0.3389) (0.3379) (0.3393) (0.3390) (0.3395) (0.3397)
Home Country (outward)  0.1774 0.1789 0.1805 0.1995 0.1856 0.1843
Foreign Investment Regulation (0.3368) (0.3401) (0.3329) (0.3364) (0.3363) (0.3320)
Host Country (inward)  -0.3093 -0.2725 -0.3298 -0.2860 -0.3010 -0.3212
Foreign Investment Regulation (0.0787) *** (0.0783) *** (0.0806) *** (0.0742) *** (0.0823) *** (0.0903) ***
Host Country Bank -0.0874 -0.0835 -0.0926 -0.1009 -0.0943 -0.0963
Entry Requirements (0.0395) ** (0.0383) ** (0.0403) ** (0.0742) ** (0.0390) ** (0.0400) **
Host Country Restrictions -0.0402 -0.0500 -0.0453 -0.0834 -0.0377 -0.0431
on Bank Activities (0.0206) ** (0.0200) ** (0.0216) ** (0.0227) *** (0.0211) * (0.0233) *
Host Country -0.0089 -0.0082 -0.0096 -0.0097 -0.0082 -0.0090
Corporate Taxes (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0057) * (0.0062) (0.0065)
0.2838 0.2901 0.2710 0.2542 0.2762 0.2674
(0.0512) *** (0.0487) *** (0.0497) *** (0.0449) *** (0.0538) *** (0.0527) ***
Host Country GDP per capita 0.0610 0.0460 0.0672 0.0435 0.0593 0.0655
(0.0135) *** (0.0129) *** (0.0146) *** (0.0126) *** (0.0131) *** (0.0172) ***
Host Country Risk 0.0005
(Composite index) (0.0058)
-0.0124 -0.0334
(0.0057) ** (0.0112) ***
0.0163 0.0607 0.0138
(0.0133) (0.0248) ** (0.0174)
0.0292 0.0181
(0.0324) (0.0414)
54.2008 49.4552 56.0415 48.8543 57.7539 58.1011
(14.3250) *** (14.5934) *** (13.9467) *** (14.6448) *** (15.5865) *** (15.5081) ***
0.3832 0.4338 0.4258 0.6739 0.3500 0.3984
(0.2008) * (0.1987) ** (0.1886) ** (0.1777) *** (0.1993) * (0.2074) *
-0.2058 -0.2081 -0.2085 -0.2230 -0.2036 -0.2067
(0.0412) *** (0.0415) *** (0.0419) *** (0.0442) *** (0.0407) *** (0.0423) ***
1.0943 1.0459 1.0612 0.8487 1.1315 1.0904
(0.4860) ** (0.4823) ** (0.4765) ** (0.4464) * (0.4810) ** (0.4766) **
0.1833 0.1955 0.1770 0.1891 0.1777 0.1739
(0.1374) (0.1363) (0.1394) (0.1380) (0.1349) (0.1369)
0.6948 0.7819 0.7274 1.0326 0.6563 0.6981
(0.2333) *** (0.2390) *** (0.2501) *** (0.2806) *** (0.2523) *** (0.2813) **
Parent Bank Size
Host Country Size
Dependent variable: Bank operates in the country=1 ; No operation in the host country=0
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
Host Country Political Risk
This table reports the first stage of Heckman probit regressions with standard error adjusted for clustering on each parent bank. A constant is estimated 
but not reported. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five and one percent, respectively.
Latin America Dummy
Bilateral Trade
Host Country Investment Risk
Dummy for Common Legal Origin
Dummy for Colonial Ties
Bilateral Distance
Dummy for Common Language
Host Country Economical RiskTable 8: 2
nd Stage Heckman Probit Estimations of the Likelihood that a Foreign Bank Operates as a Branch
Parent Bank  3.2160 3.2230 3.2421 3.2084 3.3690 3.3797
Internationalization Strategy (1.2502) *** (1.2967) ** (1.2078) *** (1.2724) ** (1.3432) ** (1.3170) ***
-0.4110 -0.4652 -0.3074 -0.3713 -0.4571 -0.3539
(0.2771) (0.2849) (0.2625) (0.2831) (0.2854) (0.2852)
Parent Bank  0.6845 0.7545 -0.8079 0.4019 0.6243 0.4405
Bussines Orientation (0.5168) (0.5189) (0.5242) (0.5463) (0.5179) (0.5296)
Home Country Regulations  -0.7395 -0.7421 -0.8079 -0.8296 -0.6977 -0.7571
on Overseas Branches (0.3027) ** (0.2956) ** (0.2985) *** (0.3024) *** 0.2952 ** (0.3064) **
-0.2566 -0.2714 -0.2799 -0.3131 -0.3021 -0.3184
(0.1492) * (0.1652) * (0.1450) * (0.1692) * (0.1640) * (0.1601) **
Affiliate Bank -0.8534 -0.8832 -0.8816 -0.9757 -0.8341 -0.8464
Bussines Orientation (0.3514) ** (0.3411) *** (0.3417) *** (0.3212) *** (0.3294) ** (0.3260) ***
-0.0315 -0.0309 -0.0347 -0.0353 -0.0315 -0.0341
0.0058 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0051 *** 0.0054 ***
-1.5340 -1.5222 -1.8713 -1.9131 -1.7945 -2.1198
(0.3213) *** (0.3637) *** (0.4233) *** (0.4754) *** (0.4699) *** (0.5914) ***
Host Country Regulations -0.8294 -0.4358 -1.3662 -0.7066 -0.6061 -1.1171
on Foreign Bank Branches (0.3227) *** (0.2475) * (0.3339) *** (0.2964) ** (0.2029) *** (0.4360) ***
Host Country Bank -0.2727 -0.2181 -0.3974 -0.3247 -0.3482 -0.4689
Entry Requirements (0.1834) (0.1827) (0.1917) ** (0.2057) (0.2102) * (0.2174) **
Host Country Restrictions 0.1196 0.1986 0.0118 0.1376 0.1647 0.0542
on Bank Activities (0.1148) (0.1149) * (0.1020) (0.1236) (0.1172) (0.1328)
Host Country 0.0694 0.0573 0.1013 0.0872 0.0886 0.1175
Corporate Taxes (0.0241) *** (0.0196) *** (0.0308) *** (0.0235) *** (0.0261) *** (0.0326) ***
-0.0451 -0.1664 0.0811 -0.1235 -0.2008 -0.0619
(0.1667) (0.1548) (0.1187) (0.1176) (0.1362) (0.1424)
Host Country GDP -0.4795 -0.3837 -0.5337 -0.2946 -0.5906 -0.6198
per Capita (0.1312) *** (0.1340) *** (0.1350) *** (0.1326) ** (0.1251) *** (0.1384) ***





(0.0557) ** (0.0678) *** (0.0654) *
0.2775 0.2555
(0.1194) ** (0.1362) *
0.1288 0.0577 -0.1187 -0.5841 0.3267 0.0469
(0.3606) (0.3582) (0.3936) (0.4308) (0.3972) (0.4585)
Wald test of indep. eqns.               
(H0: rho = 0) 0.0600 0.0900 0.0500 0.3500 0.3400 0.2400
Prob > chi2 0.8141 0.7627 0.8262 0.5542 0.5573 0.6275
Number of observation 1933 1933 1933 1933 1933 1933
Censored observations 1693 1693 1693 1693 1693 1693
Uncensored observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
This table reports the second stage of Heckman probit regressions with standard error adjusted for clustering on each parent bank. A constant is 
estimated but not reported. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** mean significance at ten, five and one percent, respectively. See 
first stage estimation for more details
Independent Variables
Host Country Investment Risk
Host Country Political Risk







Dependent variable: Branch=1 ; Sudsidiary=0
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)